LUTHER ON THE EVE OF HIS REVOLT - Rev. M. J. Lagrange, O.P

Foro de Exégesis y Teología bíblica del Instituto del Verbo Encarnado

LUTHER ON THE EVE OF HIS REVOLT - Rev. M. J. Lagrange, O.P.

LUTHER ON THE EVE OF HIS REVOLT

A criticism of Luther's Lectures on the Epistle to the Romans given at Wittenberg in 1515-1516.

Rev. M. J. Lagrange, O.P.

Translated by The Rev. W. S. Reilly, S.S.

The official birthday of the Reformation has been fixed as the 31st of October, 1517, the day Luther posted upon the door of the University Church at Wittenberg the ninety-five theses in which he bade defiance to preachers of indulgences in Germany. It was resolved, before the war into which Europe has been plunged, to celebrate with great solemnity the four hundredth anniversary of this event.

The view that Luther's challenge had great significance was held by Bossuet. That incomparable controversialist did not see in Luther's action more than a rather irresolute first step, a denunciation of an isolated abuse: "From abuses he passed to the thing itself." The Lutheran system would have grown only insensibly and according to the requirements of controversy: "However, one matter led him to another. As the doctrine of justification and of the efficacy of the Sacraments was closely connected with that of indulgences, Luther turned upon these two articles; and this controversy soon became the more importan^[1] Working on this assumption, Bossuet undertakes the difficult task of following Luther in his first movements, which he represents as sometimes bold, sometimes timid. His admirable book, so full of facts, so vigorous and serene in its reasoning, is, at the beginning, occupied with the discussion of petty quarrels. It is like the first flappings of the wings of the eagle which is starting upon its flight.

It has been shown recently that Bossuet's view about the beginnings of Lutheranism was entirely wrong. Long before the incident of October 31, 1517, Luther was already in full possession of his theological system. If all the details were not formulated, the principles had been laid down clearly and with assurance. The monk had his doctrine and his plan of reform. It is now clear that the new religion is not the result of circumstances.

The first historian to understand and to analyze the state of mind of Luther on the eve of the Reformation was an Austrian Dominican, Father Denifle, in his study on the beginnings of Lutheranism, as they are seen in the original documents.^[2]

The document which proved to be of most value was a manuscript of the "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans" which Luther, as professor of exegesis at Wittenberg, had composed in 1515-1516. We have the precise date, because the Vulgate text of the Epistle which he annotated was printed in 1515, and we know that the lectures ended in October, 1516, just one year before the publication of the theses on indulgences. We owe the discovery of this important document to Mr. Johannes Ficker, who, in his search for manuscripts bearing on the beginning of the Reformation, found, first, a copy of the "Commentary" in the archives of the Vatican Library at Rome, and then the original itself, in the handwriting of Luther, carefully preserved-- unread--in a glass case of the Royal Library of Berlin. German Protestants, who have raised to the glory of the Reformer a veritable monument of books and pamphlets, had overlooked the only absolutely reliable source of information concerning the thought of Luther when that thought was ripening into Lutheranism. Was such an oversight due to the fact that intellectual curiosity about the master's activity as a monk had been satisfied by his own stories about his life in the cloister? Did they take seriously his claim to be divinely inspired? The details of Ficker's discovery are given, too sparingly, in his edition of the Berlin manuscript,^[3] from which we shall quote in the present study.

Father Denifle was not the man to await the publication of the Berlin text. With his incomparable mastery of paleography, he set to work with the Roman copy. He realized at a glance the importance of the discovery of this book and it was not hard for such a keen theologian and historian, so admirably informed concerning the intellectual life of the Middle Ages, to realize that there was in this "Commentary" the essence of all the errors which Luther was afterward to profess. Variations might appear, called forth by polemics, but they would not fundamentally alter the system which the Augustinian monk expounded a year before his revolt. The long extracts which Father Denifle gives from the "Commentary," and the rigorous analysis to which he submits them, are the most interesting features of his great work on Luther and Lutheranism.

This work has shown conclusively, as is conceded by more than one of the many opponents Father Denifle stirred up, that Luther, when he made his attack on Catholic theology, had no knowledge of the great scholastics, including St. Thomas Aquinas. His theological reading had not extended beyond the disciples of Occam; Gabriel Biel had been his most familiar author.

A second still more important point made by the clear-sighted Thomistic theologian is that Occam exercised an influence over the dominant theory of Luther.

Protestant theologians were rather dumbfounded by the revelations which Father Denifle had made, thanks to his knowledge of the theology, the mysticism, and the liturgy of the Middle Ages. They had found it convenient to make real Christianity begin with Luther, as a Jacobin might date the history of France from the Revolution. The facts were too clear to be gainsaid. Luther's mental equipment as a reformer was poor; even as a heretic he was not so original as people had thought. So much might be granted. But when Father Denifle passed on to discuss the moral condition of Luther at the time that he was elaborating his theological system, he ceased to convince Protestants. He had laid about with a scourge of thistles among the contradictions of the theologian and, having followed the movements of his mind up to the moment when he deviated from Catholic teaching, he ventured to assign as the real cause of this deviation the infidelities of the father of the Reformation; if Luther believed concupiscence invincible, it was because he had himself, and frequently, given way to concupiscence. A clamor of Lutheran apologists broke out against the unmerciful treatment which the mendicant friar had meted out to the apostate monk. Denifle's verdict was denounced as a calumny. Harnack was as excited as the rest, although he spoke with caution. Father Denifle had called attention to what might seem insufficient concern about truth in some of the statements of this renowned historian in his work on Luther. Whatever may be thought of the correctness of Father Denifle's judgment about the moral dispositions of the father of Protestantism, this judgment did not bear on a matter which could be made so clear as Luther's state of mind. It has not found support in the more recent work of another Catholic scholar, Father Grisar, S.J., who has dealt with the question in the course of his exhaustive studies on Luther.^[4] He declares that "neither the "Commentary" on the Psalms nor that on the Epistle to the Romans gives the impression that the author was morally corrupt."^[5] Consequently, he has not sought for the origin of Luther's theories in his moral perversity.

In the following study of the "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," I shall keep this psychological problem in view. Everybody admits that Luther's personality was a considerable factor in his exegesis. Some of his admirers recognize with naive satisfaction this influence of the dispositions of his mind and heart, without seeming to know that to be guided in interpreting another's mind by one's own prepossessions and feelings, means to depart from truth. But while we endeavor to determine to what extent Luther was thus misled in his understanding of the teaching of St. Paul, we must inquire no less carefully to what extent St. Paul influenced Luther. For Luther really thought that he understood the Apostle; he was convinced, at least in the beginning, that his system was grounded on the Bible. It would be a mistake to think that he simply read into the Epistle to the Romans a system of thought formed without any dependence on the Apostle.

Before entering upon this study of the relation between the text of Romans and the Lutheran way of understanding it, of the state of soul and the exegetical methods which in part account for Luther's interpretation, it is of interest to note that a cursory reading of the Commentary makes it clear that the idea of revolt had not yet entered his thoughts. He still believed himself loyal to the Catholic Church. He purposed only to bring religion back to its purest sources. It did not occur to him that he would ever be reduced to seeking salvation outside the Church. No book, even in the Middle Ages, more frequently denounces heresy or paints heresy in darker colors than does the "Commentary." It represents the heretic as a proud man, who sins first through ignorance. If contempt be mingled with ignorance, he is in the net. Then he clings to what seems true to his own private judgment and at the moment when he thinks himself sure of the truth, freed from snares and pitfalls, he is really a captive. Next, he becomes impatient of contradiction, and will listen to nothing. Finally, he is seized with indignant zeal for his own inventions; he pursues and calumniates his enemies, seeking to harm them. His punishment has been already inflicted! The "Commentary" tells us, moreover, that, whatever heretics may do, there is always a weak spot which allows one to unmask them. you have only to ask whence they hold their mission. That is a death blow. They can allege neither prophesy nor miracles. mindful of this need of proper authorization, the Wittenberg professor is careful to shield himself behind his title: if he teaches, it is by apostolic commission. This gives him an apostolic authority and a right to blame all that is evil, even in the most exalted.

We propose here, firstly, to consider Luther's "Commentary" merely as an exegetical work, restricting ourselves to an examination of his method, and reserving until later any formal discussion of the new doctrines; secondly, to study the intellectual and moral dispositions of Luther, in so far as they may be gathered from his work on this Epistle to the Romans; thirdly, to indicate the new doctrine which the Wittenberg professor so dogmatically gave out as the genuine teaching of St. Paul, and to discuss its real relation to that teaching.

The exegesis of Luther in his lectures at the University of Wittenberg in 1515-1516 deserves study for many reasons. Foremost, it was destined to transform the religious lives of millions. Henceforth, the teaching of St. Paul as interpreted by the Augustinian professor was to become the rule of faith and practice of a large portion of the Christian world. And it still holds sway. Many Protestants admit, indeed, that while professing to interpret St. Paul, Luther simply set forth his own ideas. About the ideas themselves they care little; they are as independent in his regard as he would have them to be in regard to the teaching which was traditional in 1516. There are, however, a great many Protestants who still regard Luther as a faithful expositor of the Apostle's doctrine. Some even, like Mr. A. Jundt,^[6] exalt his exegetical fidelity to the prejudice of his originality: "St. Paul, Augustine, Calvin, have created theological systems, Luther has restored Pauline theology; his mind, attuned to that of the Apostle, acquired dogmatic precision of thought once he understood what St. Paul means in the Epistle to the Romans." Luther's system of thought possesses more than an archeological interest for the student of history of Bible interpretation.

We are fully aware, of course, that a Catholic who criticizes the giant of the Reformation can expect only disdain from Protestants. Father Denifle has recalled that many who feel perfectly free to dissect the words and actions of Jesus will not suffer any disparagement of the inviolable Luther. We are incapable, it is claimed, of understanding him. The caviling of modern dwarfs can no more reach him than the envy of a mole-hill could efface Mount Blanc. We need not, then, be embarrassed, since we do the idol no harm. Besides, we are conscious of only seeking the truth.

The text of Luther's "Commentary", as published by Johannes Ficker, is, naturally, according to the original of Berlin, with notation of variants in the Vatican copy, which differs very slightly from the text. The first volume is consecrated to the "Glosses," the second to the "Scholia". The work of Luther comprises, indeed, two very distinct parts.

He used, for the first of these parts, a printed text of the Epistle to the Romans according to the Vulgate, with considerable space between the lines. This space is devoted to a first series of "Glosses" which were only another way of expressing the idea of the sacred writer. Sometimes a word is substituted for another in an endeavor to get nearer the meaning of the Greek, sometimes several words are paraphrased or explained. These annotations are for the most part brief indications of consequences to be drawn from a text. In the edition of Ficker the text of the Bible is printed in heavy (Egyptian) characters, and the gloss follows in Italic. The following translation will give an idea of the book:

Romans 1.28: And as they did not approve, make efforts, or diligently strive to have God in their knowledge, that their heart might not be darkened, the knowledge of God being lost. This, I say, they did not care about, therefore God delivered them up to a worthy chastisement, by a just judgment, to a reprobate sense, a dishonest mind, etc.

Other glosses were placed in the margin. They are by way of development of the former, explaining more in detail the meaning of the Greek text, or the thought of the Apostle, and at times they contain citations, etc. In Ficker these glosses are assigned a place by themselves, under the others, with indication of the texts to which they refer.

The text, together with interlinear and marginal glosses, occupies only 28 pages in quarto, whereas the "Scholia" extend from p. 29 to p. 152 of the manuscript. The "Scholia" form a continuous commentary, if the name can be given to such an original work. Some words of the text are still quoted, but digressions are not rare. It is in the "Scholia" that we find the developments which refer to the new doctrine. The glosses reflect it also, but less clearly, either because Luther was naturally led to write these short notes in the terminology of traditional exegesis, or because the text of St. Paul itself served as a barrier. The new ideas are freely set forth only in the "Scholia".

It is in these "Scholia" that it would have been well to determine the logical connection of the Apostle's thought. The system of St. Thomas is known: he reproduces the Latin text of a pericope; then he dismembers it, so to speak, to point out the order of the propositions, the relations of causality, finality, or consequence. After this he goes on to examine the propositions, endeavoring solely to disengage their meaning. He willingly notes the various solutions which may be given, and sets down analogous biblical passages. This commentary of St. Thomas would be a model of an objective explanation, if such could be produced without having recourse to the original text, and if one might interpret a book without studying its environment, the origin and conflict of doctrines--without applying all that we call historical exegesis.

St. Thomas has at least the merit of keeping his own personality in the background. Father Denifle shows us how impersonal this method was. "If we compare," he writes in a sort of supplement to his work on Luther,^[7] "the Commentary of St. Thomas with those which immediately preceded it,^[8] we find in these earlier ones, to speak in a general way, the same questions, often the same solutions, the same scriptural texts, although more numerous; but in the commentary of St. Thomas, as in his "Summa", everything is handled with more perspicuity, is better understood, is grasped in a surer and more objective way. He did not, however, invent his method; he only employed logically the traditional way of expounding Scripture."

All the works of the scholastic exegetes remained almost unknown to Luther.[9] He has, indeed, a few allusions to Peter Lombard, and Mr. Ficker has expressed the view that he had under his eyes a Latin Vulgate containing the divisions of St. Thomas; but his contempt for scholasticism, which led him to an open rupture with the system, kept him from consulting, except perhaps very rarely, the exegetes of the Middle Ages.

This neglect was unfortunate, for, although the schoolmen went too far in their concern for logical order, bringing it into St. Paul to such an extent as to reduce its utterances to a series of well-drawn conclusions, they could at least have taught Luther to inform himself about the plan of the Apostle, perfectly recognizable in its main lines in spite of the almost tumultuous appearance of his style.

In his scorn for scholasticism did the Augustinian monk prefer to go directly to the Fathers? The influence of St. Augustine is evident. Luther has told us what an impression was made upon him by the "De spiritu, et littera." This might be recognized by simply reading his work. The books against Julian, "De nuptiis et concupiscentia" and others, furnish him with quotations and veritable extracts. We shall have to inquire how far he really reproduced the thought of one whom he regarded as the founder of his order, and to whom he had consecrated so much and such exclusive admiration. St. Ambrose is named ten times, twice without any special reason,^[10] once following Erasmus,^[11] four times following St. Augustine;^[12] and, let us add, a citation which is rather inaccurate[13] and one which Luther probably borrowed from a citation of another.^[14] In the single passage where Ambrose is quoted as a commentator, reference is made to the distinguished work which we call, for want of a better name, the "Ambrosiaster." Luther knew it, consequently, but he did not make much use of it. St. Cyprian is named three times, always following St. Augustine. Chrysostom himself is not otherwise cited. This is fortunate for him, because he would surely have been rudely handled. St. Jerome was better known, but especially as the translator of the Old Testament.

Luther was not obliged to display in his "Commentary" wide acquaintance with the opinions of the Fathers, but he should at least have avoided incorrect general statements about writings which he had not read. He frequently misrepresents them. For instance, on the words of the text: "Let every man abound in his own sense," Luther writes: "This saying is taken everywhere (passim) by the Holy Fathers and Doctors for a general declaration, by which every man is allowed to abound in his own sense in the understanding of the Scriptures."^[15]

Concerning this statement Mr. Ficker notes that the exegesis of Romans 14.5 is met with neither in the Fathers nor in the Scholastics. When the "Commentary" speaks of "the Fathers," one can be sure that Luther has in mind hardly any one but St. Augustine, in whom the Augustinian monk hears the whole school. It is again Mr. Ficker himself who has noticed this.^[16] It is, then, rather to ignorance than to bad faith that we may attribute Luther's allegation about the traditional interpretation of Romans 1.17, so severely judged by Father Denifle, upon whom it imposed enormous researches.^[17]

Luther had accustomed himself to put down as an "opinion of the Fathers" any view which in his own neighborhood was regarded as traditional. However, he had direct knowledge of St. Bernard, whose authority he willingly alleged alongside that of St. Augustine. Once he even attributes to Augustine an idea which was suggested by Bernard.^[18] And he grafts upon his words a whole theory.^[19] But it is as an ascetic Doctor much more than as an exegete that Bernard is cited; only one gloss is borrowed from him.^[20]

If now we return to more recent commentators, we find Luther making use of the "Ordinary" and of the "Interlineary" glossaries current in his time.^[21] These he had habitually under his eyes. He also used Nicholas de Lyra, quoted oftener when he parts company with him in his interpretation than when they agree. Paul of Burgos is named several times.

Luther himself has defined the attitude which he intended to assume in the explanation of the word of God, for we may apply to his whole method what he says of one passage (Romans 1.3-4):

"I do not know whether this passage has been really and truly expounded by anyone. The ancients were prevented from doing so by the incorrectness of the translation, the more recent commentators, by the absence of the spirit."^[22]

A concise formula, but strong and expressive, such as occur frequently under his pen. He believed, then, with the most enlightened minds of his time, that the moment had come for exegetes to define with more precision the meaning of words. For this recourse must be had to the original text. Illustrious humanists had opened the way in the case of the Greek New Testament. Luther, so independent in regard to the Scholastics, does not hesitate to accept the moderns as his real authorities. For everything pertaining to the sense of the Greek he depends on Lefevre d'Etaples. The first edition of the "Epistole Pauli A postoli" had appeared in Paris in the year 1512. Luther never disputed d'Etaples' authority as a Hellenist until the day a more luminous star came within the ken of Wittenberg. The "Novum Testamentum" of Erasmus appeared at Basle only in 1516, but Luther already uses it after his ninth chapter. Henceforth Erasmus is the master for Greek and references to the Greek text become more and more frequent in the glosses, while allusions to the religious and political conditions of the times are multiplied in the "Scholia". The mendicant monk entered at the same time into the current of humanism and into Erasmus'aspirations for reform. It is even probable (Ficker infers it from the handwriting)^[23] that more than one philological note was added in the margin to the first part of the "Commentary" after Erasmus had appeared.

But Erasmus was already[24] for Luther what he so loudly declared him to be in their controversy on free will, a profane and superficial humanist, little concerned about the things of God. If the new exegesis had "correctness of translation" (proprietas verborum), there was lacking to it the spirit of the ancients, by which Luther meant especially the doctrine of Augustine, the faithful interpreter of the Holy Spirit, who had spoken by the mouth of Paul.

Whence we may conclude that his ideal was to compose a commentary which should be above reproach as regards the explanation of the Greek but nevertheless penetrated by the spirit which had animated the Apostle. So we shall see him consciously depart from the literal sense under the influence of the view that the meaning of Paul can only be attained by those who are "in spirit."

"The solution is: because the Apostle speaks in spirit, he is not understood except by those who are in spirit."^[25]

Luther was well inspired in accepting the authority of the humanists. His competency in Greek was at the time very mediocre. He learned it only later on from Melanchthon and he always remained far inferior to Erasmus in regard to the understanding of words. It is true that Erasmus'philological tact was wonderful.

It would be a loss of time to point out here the cases, more and more numerous, in which Luther translates according to the Greek, frequently insisting on its difference from the Vulgate. Mr. Ficker has taken care in such cases to note the translation of Lefevre and that of Erasmus. Luther always respected their authority. Towards the end of his "Commentary", after having defended at length his view on the meaning of "philoutimoumenos" (Rom. 15. 20), which he translates "ambitiosus" with Lefevre against Erasmus, he is careful to make a concession to the authority of the great humanist.^[26] His tone is here very far from the disdain which he shows for theologians. He doubtless realized his linguistic inferiority.

And, indeed, his personal contribution does not equal even that of Lefevre, not to speak of Erasmus. The former had translated Romans 1.3-4: "de filio suo . . . definito filio Dei in potestate . . . Jhesu Christo domino nostro." Luther translates "horisthentos", "destinato sive definito, declarato, ordinato," etc., without seeming to attach much importance to the varieties of meaning which these words represent.^[27] He hesitates to replace "Jhesu Christi Domini nostri" by the ablative on the ground that the Greek text is equivocal.^[28] However, he is right in retaining [29] "secundum spiritum sanctificationis," which Lefevre had translated "per spiritum sanctitatis."

One does not see why he replaced "in die" (Rom. 2.5) by "in diem;" he notes "Greci, in diem, et melius,"^[30] but no authority, Greek or Latin, known to us, can have suggested this.

The Latin text "credita sunt . . . eloquia Dei" (Rom. 3. 2), like the Greek "episteuthesan", signifies that the word of God has been entrusted to the Jews. Perhaps on account of his preoccupation concerning the role of faith, Luther understands the text to mean that the Jews had believed the word of God.^[31] Nevertheless, he puts aside the reading "ab illis," which would lead to this confusion, and retains only "credita sunt eloquia Dei."

Another still stranger confusion. In the famous text on Original Sin (Rom.5.12) "in quo" is glossed "peccato originali," and this sense is maintained in the "Scholia": "Sed nullum aliud est, in quo omnes peccaverunt, proprium peccatum, sed unusquisque in suo pecato."^[32] Is it that Luther has neglected to consult the Greek text of this important passage? He would not have understood "eph o" of sin, which is feminine (hamartia). But he has expressed himself further on concerning this "in quo":

"This is ambiguous in Greek, whether masculine or neuter.^[33] Therefore, it seems that the, Apostle wished it understood in both senses."

Consequently a double literal sense, commented on by St. Augustine. Luther holds decidedly to the neuter. The authority of St. Augustine dispenses him from a deeper study of the Greek.

This same authority prevented him from noticing a remark of Lefevre on the meaning of "katergazesthai" (Rom. 7.18), which is not "perficere" (to perfect), but simply "operari" (to do). But it would have been necessary to give up the doctrinal opposition between "facere" and "perficere,"^[34] favorable to his thesis, as we shall see. I cannot blame him for having confirmed the meaning of "perficere" in Romans 7.18 by Galatians 5.16, where the Greek has another verb,^[35] since he is in this place [36] but following St. Augustine.

Father Denifle [37] also appears to me too severe when he condemns the exegesis of "ego ipse" (I myself) in Romans 7.25: "I," he says, "the whole man, the same person, serve in both services."^[38]

Luther should have consulted the Greek text (autos ego), which authorizes the explanation: "If alone, if left to myself." St. Augustine and St. Thomas (unus et idem)^[39] are guilty of the same neglect. In reality, both explanations are, perhaps, equally probable. Needless to say, St. Augustine in no wise authorizes Luther to conclude: "Simsul justus est et peccat" (While just he sins).

On the other hand, Father Denifle is right in censuring Luther—as Melanchthon did before him--for treating the statement about faith in Hebrews 11.1 as if "substantia futurarum rerum" (the substance of things future) meant the possession of, and power of using, future things: "possessio et facultas futurarum rerum."^[40]

We again find in the "Commentary" on Romans 8.35 St. Augustine opposed to Lefevre in express terms, this time in a case where the latter is on the right side; the love of Christ is indeed that which He has for us, active and not passive. In other cases Lefevre has proved unreliable as a guide. "Abba ho pater" (Rom. 8.15) is transcribed in Latin and made equivalent to "Abba, quod est pater,"^[41] as if the article represented the relative of the two readings (Rom. 9.10): "Isaac, patre nostro" and "Isaac patris nostri," the first is better. Luther prefers the second with Lefevre against Erasmus, whose influence is about to begin.^[42]

Nevertheless, it doubtless would be unjust to judge of his knowledge of Greek by the translation of "philos" by "amor," which came down to him from the exegesis of the Middle Ages.^[43]

Taking it all in all, Luther made a judicious use of the humanists. Father Denifle complains, without giving definite cases, that he sounds the trumpet when the Greek text seems to favor him.^[44]

These cases are assuredly not very frequent. Here are two. In his interlinear gloss Luther has the certainly correct translation: "quod enim mortuus est" (Rom. 6.10), but in the marginal gloss:

"In greco habetur: quod enim mortuum est peccato, mortuum est semel" et multo melius. "Quod autem vivit, vivit Deo." Quod, i.e., quodeunque, pronominaliter, non conjunctionaliter.

"There is no greater vice in a translator, because he imparts to others his own idea, which is not in him whom he translates."^[45]

He is surely in good faith; he does not suspect, then, that he himself adds to the text, or rather inflicts upon it an interpretation contrary to the mind of the writer in the interest of his thesis, namely, that sin truly dies only at the threshold of eternal life:

"Nor can he again die to sin, who has once died to sin, for there has followed upon it eternal justice, which nevermore sins."^[46]

Another case where prepossession is not less evident. The Greek "genestho de ho theos alethes" (Rom. 3. 4) has been translated in the Vulgate, "Est autem Deus verax." It was impossible to translate "fiat," because Paul meant in the logical sense: let it then be well understood that God is truthful. This is what Lefevre has well seen in rendering "esto." Luther follows him, but treats the verb as a real imperative and connects with it the scriptural text which follows:

"That this is to be taken in an imperative sense is proved by the authority which he alleges. . . .^[47] As it is written, that is to say that we must believe in him, because to be justified is to believe, as will be said below."^[48]

However, this tendency to seek for his doctrine in the original texts is much more apparent in his elucubrations on the Hebrew. In dealing with the Bible, Greek was not alone to be considered. It was necessary to go back to the language of the Old Testament. This was not without interest even for the Epistle to the Romans, which cites so many passages of Moses and the Prophets. In this domain, too, a revolution was going on, and the conflict between the Dominicans of Cologne and Reuchlin marks its inception. Luther held all the more sympathy with the Hebrew scholar that he thought he could get from him support for some points of his doctrine. We are obliged to insist on his mistakes, which go even beyond those of Reuchlin.

Here is an example connected with justification. When we recognize God's justice, He is justified for us; it is, on our part, an act of faith, which He reckons unto us for righteousness. At the same time, then, that He is justified, He justifies. And this double operation is altogether conformable to the double state of the Scripture, passive in Greek and Latin, "ut justificeris," active in Hebrew. This is said in express terms:

"Thus it is in agreement with the Hebrew,^[49] which has: 'I have sinned against thee, therefore thou shalt justify,' that is, work justification, 'by thy word and cleanse when thou judgest.' Consequently, when justified He justifies, and when He justifies He is justified. Wherefore the same is expressed by the active verb in Hebrew and by the passive in our translation."^[50]

This astonishing argument is baseless, since the Hebrew text of Psalm 50 (51).6 has the passive as well as the Greek: "That thou mayest be recognized just in thy sentence, and clear from reproach in thy judgment."

At times Luther has recourse to the Septuagint which Augustine may have led him to regard as an inspired translation. For instance, he notes that no one is exempt from concupiscence, "not even a child of one day," a reference to Job 14.4 according to the Septuagint.^[51]

But the Hebrew serves Luther above all to establish imputative justice. Here again Reuchlin furnishes him with a translation, very literal in appearance, on which he engrafts a very fantastic interpretation.

As an example we may cite the following commentary on Psalms 32.1-2: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin":

"Blessed (that is, it is well with him), who becomes unburdened," that is, who by grace is made free from the load of crime, namely, the actual sin which he has committed. But this is not enough; there must be at the same time a covering for sin, that is, his radical evil must not be imputed as sin. It is then passed by when it exists indeed, but is not seen, not observed, not imputed.... Blessed the man, the Lord will not impute unto him his iniquity."^[52]

Luther pretends very seriously that the Hebrew constantly maintains this distinction between actual and original sin. If it is not recognized, it is the fault of the Vulgate:

"These differences are always kept in the Hebrew, but the translation lacks precision and everything is consequently very confused."^[53]

He goes on to maintain without blinking that "Pescha" signifies actual sin, "Hattaa" original sin, "Aon" the absence of righteousness, "Rascha" impiety or the vice of pride, the setting up of one's own righteousness.^[54]

It may be that Luther was under the spell of the word "to impute"; but if he was, he did not delay to exert upon the text the influence of his own ideas. It is useless to prove that his nice defining of the meaning of Hebrew terms is arbitrary and false.

When not preoccupied with his theories, he occasionally makes a judicious remark. Thus, on Romans 11.27:

"The words, 'When I shall take away their sins' are not in Isaias, but either have been added by the Apostle or have been taken from other prophets."^[55]

Another observation, which indicates some knowledge of the Hebrew language, is his interlinear gloss on Romans 15.13:

"In virtute spiritus sancti, i.e., per virtutem spiritus sancti; hebraica locutio quae equivocum habet hane prepositionem 'in.' [56]

That is, Paul would have allowed to appear in Greek the instrumental meaning of the Hebrew "beth." This erudition did not come to maturity, but it is interesting to see Luther entering upon a path which was later to be followed by so many, not without some danger.

Incidentally we have just met with the delicate question of Paul's citations of the Old Testament. Luther does not seem to have any very definite criterion. At times he expresses himself as a rigid conservative. For instance, to reconcile the divergencies of the text of Paul (who quotes from the Septuagint) with the Hebrew, he maintains that both are right:

"Consequently, both texts have the same thing, but the LXX express the cause, the Hebrew the effect, as is very often the case."^[57]

I do not know where he found this rule or what examples he might have given. Elsewhere he expresses himself like a modern critic:

"(The Apostle) cites the Bible as it was possessed by those to whom he was writing."^[58]

In certain cases Paul seems to depart freely from both texts. Then Luther very justly holds that the Apostle has a right to argue from the Scriptures without confining himself to the literal sense. On "Who shall ascend into heaven" (Rom. 10 . 6) he remarks:

"Moses does not use the words in this sense in Deuteronomy 30, but the Apostle under the Spirit's influence draws out the meat of them with true insight, teaching us as by a powerful argument that the whole Bible deals everywhere with Christ alone, when its inner meaning is perceived, although on the surface it speaks of other matters--figures and shadows."^[59]

In this case, then, the Apostle would have argued from the spiritual sense. Father Cornely interprets the passage still more freely, maintaining that St. Paul simply uses the biblical terms without precise argumentation .

Elsewhere Luther himself offers another solution. On Romans 4.17, instead of simply noting that the words, "before God whom he believed" are not part of the citation from Genesis (as he reads "credidisti" and does not consult the Greek, Lefevre having neglected to do so), he supposes that Paul borrows from other Jewish books:

"This is not in the Hebrew, but it is usefully added to confute the Jews, from whose books the Apostle doubtless took it."^[60]

This solution is again very conservative if these books of the Jews were regarded as inspired, but we have already seen, in citing his remarks on Romans 11.27, that he thought that the Apostle had a right to add his own words. Lefevre had called his attention to the freedom of some of St. Paul's citations (on Rom. 4.17).

We have seen Luther admit in the most sweeping fashion the spiritual sense of Scripture. He was then naturally led on to allegorical explanations. In fact, he does use allegory much more than St. Thomas. It was perhaps a matter of tradition and habit; or perhaps he wished to preserve, in the modern exegesis which he was inaugurating, that spirit whose rights he championed.

His allegories are not very remarkable. Paul begins with the Romans, who were the head of the world, as John baptized Christ beginning with the head; the Epistle of Paul is then like a river of Paradise or the Nile, etc.^[61] Moses fleeing from the rod changed into a serpent, is a figure of the man to whom the law is promulgated.[62] Christ is named Hermon, because he was anathematized by the Jews.^[63] The Jews coming to Christ at the end of time are prefigured by the brethren of Joseph.^[64] Those who do not for the sake of higher service consent to abandon their present occupations, refuse to lend an ass to the Savior, etc.^[65]

Luther's inclination to look at everything from the moral point of view prevents him at times from paying sufficient attention to the literal meaning. The expression of Romans 2. 22, "sacrilegium facis" (thou committest sacrilege), is explained in the interlinear gloss:

"By polluting and violating, by evil desires, the true temple of God which is the heart."^[66]

It is not that he does not know what the meaning of "hierosuleis" is; in the "Scholia" he interprets it:

But he immediately launches into two moral meanings to which he adds that of his gloss.

This is not the work of an innovator. Nor could one do Luther the honor to consider him as a pioneer in historical exegesis. Scholars of the past century have discussed the reason of St. Paul's addressing to Rome a treatise on the relation of the Gospel to the law. They asked whether the Romans were imbued with judaizing errors, and they studied the relations between Jews and Gentiles. But the questions had long been put. Marcion dealt with them; St. Thomas had given them thought. They never occurred to Luther, until he came to the second of Romans, which speaks of the strong and the weak. Brought thus face to face with them, he simply notes that everything the Apostle says is aimed at the Jewish superstition, which certain false apostles taught concerning foods and days.^[67]

Naturally Luther contemplates with sympathy the freedom of mind shown by the Apostle; but the abuses with which Paul had to deal inspired less interest than did those of his own times; the Rome of Nero could not take his mind away from the Rome of Leo.

However, he felt very keenly the difficulty presented by the sixteenth chapter of Romans, which has so much interested modern scholars. How did Paul, who had never been in Rome, know so many people there? All his Asiatic friends would seem to have gone thither before him. Luther did not, as has been claimed, raise this question; and the solution, which he gives as personal, is clearly bad:

"Therefore I meanwhile in my own mind will to think this, that these persons are all Achaians and Corinthians, whom the Apostle commends to them, that they may know and greet them."^[68]

So the Romans are invited to salute friends of the Apostles who remain in Greece. The reason would be the Hebrew custom of placing in the Synagogues the names of all Jews in tribal order. Even if this custom had been constant, it would throw no light on the problem.

What century has not resounded, in countries whose people were capable of self-expression, with the old lamentation over the attacks and the victories of evil within us? Plato made Socrates describe the astonishment of reason in presence of the unleashed wild beasts of the lower appetite.^[69] St. Paul had figured in the anguish of his double self all humanity involved in sin. Manichaeism, a long-lived and vigorous heresy, assigned to evil an almost divine position; it transported the conflict into the spheres of the deity.

Luther was one of the sons of Adam who suffered most painfully from the attacks of what he called concupiscence: leanings to pride, anger, the pleasures of sense. He could not, like the platonic Gnostics, attribute this domestic hostility to the fall of the spirit into matter, still less see in it the eternal battle of two divine principles.

He thought that St. Paul furnished him with the desired explanation; concupiscence was the heritage of man from his first sinful father; it was original sin.

St. Paul taught, indeed, that the disobedience of Adam had brought into the world a sin which is transmitted from father to son, and the punishment of which is death. But he thought. of this situation only by way of comparison with the state of the first man, a happy state from which the human race had been degraded. He did not teach that we have inherited a nature irremediably vitiated. An important group of theologians (and it may be said that there is no Catholic theologian today who does not belong to it) explained that original sin, transmitted to all, is only the privation of this privilege, called original justice, granted to our first parents. Nature is really lowered and despoiled of the gifts which God had destined for it, but it is not thereby deprived of free-will. And St. Paul had shown admirably that the goodness of God, frustrated at first in its designs, had afterwards realized them in Christ with more richness. Through Christ, through Baptism received in Christ's name--an external act by which the believer subjects himself to Christ and is incorporated into Him, sin loses its hold. The Christian is dead to sin; he is freed, purified from the original stain. He retains, indeed, his nature, composed of a reasonable soul, and a body the tendencies of which arc too often in conflict with the soul's aspirations. In this respect his situation is not changed. What was called concupiscence before Baptism may still be so termed. But henceforth the spirit of Jesus dwells in His faithful disciple and causes him to live with His life; the struggle is no longer between powerless reason and the flesh,--pride, anger, luxury,--which dragged it into sin; it is between the spirit which is in him, a principle of action which theologians called grace, and these same evil tendencies. Moreover, an assurance of victory is given. The Christian must have full confidence. If God has granted him such means of salvation, it shows that He wishes to save him.

This is, briefly stated, the economy of salvation to which Luther opposes his precise negation already in 1515. The new idea of his "Commentary" on the Epistle to the Romans, Denifle and Ficker agree, is the identification of concupiscence with sin. This fundamental idea of the system of theology, which was taking shape, had not been expressed in his earlier writings, but it is asserted at the beginning of the "Commentary" and runs all through it. The sinfulness of concupiscence is, he maintains, the principal doctrine of St. Paul; the Apostle's chief aim is to establish the necessity of Christ's righteousness for the destruction of sin by making all recognize that they are sinners.

"The main point and intention of the Apostle in this Epistle is to destroy self-righteousness and reliance on one s own wisdom, and to construct, increase, and magnify sins and folly, which were not (i. e., not thought to be, on account of our good opinion of ourselves); his purpose, I say, is to make us realize that sins still exist, that they are great and numerous, and thus to bring home to us our need of Christ and His righteousness."^[70]

In the gloss, he uses the plural sins, but in the "Scholia" the singular is employed:

"The supreme object of this Epistle is to destroy, etc.... and to plant and constitute and magnify sin (although this was not or was not thought to be)."^[71]

We shall see more clearly, as we proceed, that this sin is concupiscence. However one scrutinizes Luther's propositions, he will come to this fundamental point of his system: concupiscence is a sin of our nature which nothing removes. Neither Baptism nor Penance change anything. We are sinners and must acknowledge it. Therein lies our only hope of salvation. If we are very humble, if we confess our sin, if we have confidence in Christ, and if nevertheless we resign ourselves willingly to damnation, in case it should be God's will, we shall be saved.

There is still some indecision as regards the proposed remedy. Most frequently it is humility, which is always on Luther's lips, and already it is faith, understood as personal assurance of salvation. But what is settled from the start, and what is affirmed with ever-growing confidence, is the irremediable corruption of our nature. We are sinners, hence we do not possess righteousness, nor anything to make us agreeable to God. By the sin of Adam it was human nature itself that was vitiated. It became incapable of doing good. If it tries, it but adds presumption and insolence to its powerlessness. To endeavor to perform good works is to sin more and more irremissibly.

This radical pessimism must lead to despair. Luther understands the danger and he offers deliverance. To those who are humble God does not impute sin. Sin remains, the fundamental thesis requires this, but it is not an obstacle to salvation. Every sin is, however, essentially mortal, so contaminated is the source of our actions. But our sin is imputed by God as venial. What is more, to those who believe, faith is imputed as righteousness. We are then sinners but, at the same time, if we have faith, we are righteous, although, strictly speaking, only in hope. Righteousness will not be conferred on us until the moment of our death. Righteous and sinners--a paradoxical antithesis, which delights Luther and which he develops with endless variations.

He triumphs, for he possesses at last the means to crush pride, to make man withdraw into the mire of his sin to bring him back into the way of salvation. Yes, he is deeply convinced that all theology was astray, that men were deceiving themselves in seeking salvation by good works, that they must restore to God all His rights, abase themselves before Him as the only righteous One, yield themselves to Him as alone able to perform good actions in them, render Him glory by going with docility to the goal to which He leads them, blessedness or damnation. Human liberty disappeared--even human activity--in a pessimistic quietism.

Now it is certain that the source of this false mysticism is not in St. Paul. A few belated orthodox Lutherans still maintain that it is; but more and more numerous in German universities are the professors of theology, that is to say, of Biblical exegesis, who no longer seek to find Lutheranism in the Epistle to the Romans or any part of the Scriptures. It is true that both Testaments proclaim that man is a sinner. This is a confession which mystics have ever found sweet, but without. denying that God gives grace when He pardons. One of the Psalms congratulates the man to whom God "does not impute his sin." But it was understood that God's attitude means that the sin is forgiven. And if St. Paul repeats after Genesis that the faith of Abraham "was reputed to him unto justice," it is but an expression cited in passing, such as it stands, which must be understood according to the general spirit of his teaching. Now if the modern rationalistic critics considered themselves authorized to address reproaches to St. Paul, they would say that he exaggerated the splendor of the gift of God in the Christian soul. For him Christian life, far from being a prolongation of the life of sin, is such an evident transformation that more than one non-Catholic exegete qualifies it as a magical effect. This is assuredly going too far, or rather it is putting it badly; but the qualification allows us to measure the distance between an unbiased interpretation and that which Luther imposed upon his followers.

The question now arises more definitely: How did this doctrine, the novelty of which no one should doubt, take possession of Luther's mind and inspire such absolute conviction?

There exists Luther's own explanation, given towards the end of his life, in 1545, in the preface of his Latin works. Here he describes with complacency the manner in which God gave him light:

"I was burning with the desire to understand St. Paul's epistle to the Romans. Ardor was not lacking, but I was ever coming in collision with this expression of the first chapter of Romans, In the Gospel is revealed the justice of God."^[72]

"I hated the words justice of God, which I had learned from the usage of all doctors to understand in the philosophical sense. I thought it meant what they call formal or active justice, that with which God is just when He punishes sinners and the unrighteous."

"Notwithstanding the irreproachable character of my life as a monk, I felt that I was a sinner before God and my conscience was uneasy. Were the satisfactions which I offered God sufficient to appease Him? I had no certitude that they were. So I did not love this just and avenging God.... I was troubled in conscience and I ceaselessly applied myself to this passage of Paul in the keen desire to know what it meant."

"I thus meditated day and night, until God had pity on me. I gave attention to the connection of these words: The justice of God is revealed in the Gospel, as it is written: the just man shall live by faith, and I perceived that the justice of God must be understood of the justice which God imparts, that by which the just man lives, that is to say, faith. The meaning of the sentence was then: The justice which is revealed in the Gospel is passive justice, by which God in His mercy justifies us by means of faith. At once I felt myself born to a new life. It seemed to me that the gate of Paradise opened wide before me."

"Henceforth Scripture took on a new aspect. . . . I next read 'De Spiritu et litera.' Contrary to my expectation I found that Augustine understood, like myself, by the justice of God that with which God clothes us when He justifies us."

We know through the labors of Father Denifle that before the time when Luther wrote, sixty-six Latin commentators, in works printed or in manuscript, had given the words in Romans 1.17 this interpretation. And if any one (several modern writers have done so) took the words "justice of God" to mean not the justice communicated but the divine attribute of justice, absolutely no one had ever understood it of the avenging justice. Where then did Luther get the opinion of "all the doctors"? And if he was mistaken about this point, he may well have been mistaken in a different way when he attributed to himself an interpretation which he would only subsequently have found in Augustine.

The facts are so clear that one might ask if Father Denifle had not taken too much trouble to establish them. But it is doubtful whether Luther's admirers would have laid down their arms in presence of a less convincing demonstration of the levity with which the Reformer related his personal history. We still read in Mr. Ficker: "It matters little for our appreciation of Luther that nearly all (?) previous commentators understood Romans 1.17 in the same way, as Father Denifle has proved with meritorious exactitude and wealth of evidence. The new (!) interpretation impressed him only when read in Augustine. And that is on the whole what is decisive."^[73] It is, then, Paul interpreted by Augustine who would have made an impression on Luther. But Mr. Ficker knows that the dominant idea of the system came before he learned it from Augustine. What suggested it?

Victorious concupiscence, Father Denifle has answered. When Luther entered the cloister with the purpose of sanctifying himself, he was too much imbued with the teachings of Occam. He fancied that holiness depended exclusively on his own efforts. This notion, which he held in good faith, had to give way. Concupiscence proved too strong for him; he concluded that it was invincible and consequently that it was impossible to keep the commandments.

This invincible concupiscence he identified with original sin, and he sought salvation, which he was unwilling to give up, only in the righteousness of Christ.

This view of Father Denifle attributes nearly everything in the evolution of Luther's system to experience; he makes no allowance, as far as I can see, for the direct influence of St. Paul upon it. Under the discouragement of a fall, Luther framed a theory which would help him out of his difficulties. Father Denifle notes the time when the identification of concupiscence and original sin appears; he exposes Luther's state of soul, and, concurrently, the variations of his doctrine. He leaves St. Paul out of the question.

Mr. Jundt likewise insists upon Luther's moral experience. He excludes, however, as might have been expected, the notion that Luther had sinned; he even identifies Luther's experience with that of Paul. His last word is that: "this system rests upon the data of individual experience of the believer, confirmed and completed by the testimony of Holy Writ."^[74] This places Scripture in an important, though secondary place; and such it certainly had in Luther's mind.

I believe, for my own part, that Mr. Jundt's formula would be exact if only it added some indication of the fact that it was not Holy Writ itself, but Holy Writ as it was understood by Luther, that confirmed his individual experience. Lutheranism issued from its author's personal dispositions, and from his misinterpretation of the Epistle to the Romans.

It is not merely by logical deduction that both Catholic and Protestant theologians have recognized the important part played by individual experience in Luther's doctrine. His passionate personality reveals itself frequently. Later on he will speak of adopting some point to annoy the Pope. But already in the "Commentary" he writes: